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DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
IN LATIN AMERICA 
(Introductory notes) 
1- In recent years, it has become increasingly evident that new 
and unified approaches are required to tackle development problems. 
It is no longer a question of drawing attention once again to the 
dichotomy between development and economic growth, although this 
has lost none of its validity; on the contrary. It is true that 
progress has been made in the field of analyses and policies, since 
development is now understood to be a quantitative process of economic 
growth and a qualitative process of structural social change. It is 
therefore necessary to emphasize explicitly the need for coherence 
betiijeen the style of development, the forms of organization and 
running of society, and the possibility that this offers all its 
members to participate in the taking of decisions and the benefits 
that development generates. 
2« Judging from various conventional quantitative indicators, such 
as growth, total and per capita domestic product, industrial production, 
exports and imports, etc., economic growth has taken place in most 
Latin American countries. However, this growth carries with it a 
number of characteristics that render it more or less unacceptable in 
terms of development and human values. These include the meagre capacity 
of economic systems to absorb all their potential human resources 
productively, the failure to cope with situations of extreme poverty 
deriving both from this limited capacity and from the inequality of 
income distribution, the growing tendency for the productive structure 
to be geared towards the provision of sophisticated consumer goods for 
the high-income groups instead of the large-scale production of essential 
goods and goods for social use, and the lack of any real participation 
of the population in decision-making, not only at the level of local 
units - whether as producers or consumers - but also in respect of the 
democratic definition of broad national objectives. 
/3. The 
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3» The lack of proper development as defined above results not 
only in the minimal or non-existent participation of vast majority 
sectors of the population but also in the absence of any appropriate 
incentives to improve the rational capacity pf these sectors in the 
realm of personal and social decisions, so as to facilitate the 
emergence of forms of organization and social conduct that reflect 
and correlate their requirements and interests more satisfactorily. 
On the contrary, the mass media and political propaganda machines 
bombard them with frequently alienating and irrational messages that 
disturb their sense of reality, their personal priorities and their 
general orientations, thereby limiting their ability to take their 
own decisions and participate constructively and creatively in social 
life« The capacity to organize themselves and press for higher 
incomes, the ability to gear their consumption to their individual 
purchasing power and requirements, and their personal behaviour in 
terms of procreation and family life are thus inclined to be 
profoundly modified by these psychological pressures that hinder the 
attainment of higher and more suitable levels of rationality and the 
progress towards the taking of responsible personal decisions that 
are more firmly based on the values and interests of the individuals 
and of society as a whole« 
A major aspect of most recent manifestations of economic growth 
in Latin America is growing internal inequality in the distribution 
of income. This is true both of countries that have experienced very 
rapid economic growth, industrial modernization and intense urbanization, 
and in countries which have registered slow growth or are predominantly 
rural. The reasons for this phenomenon are varied and complex and it 
would be optimistic to imagine that reference to a few isolated factors 
could provide a satisfactory explanation. A clearer understanding of 
the problem of concentration of income must be based on a more general 
view of the situation that takes into account the manner in which the 
income is generated and distributed among the community and the 
domination structure that contributes to reproducing and maintaining 
it. Patterns of income distribution do not arise arbitrarily; their 
/roots are 
roots are to be found in historical trends.and in the structure of 
society, that is to say, in the formation of the types of production 
and relative levels of productivity, in the social ratios of 
production and the social classes, in the ecological distribution 
of the population, etc. Another factor that has a bearing on the 
concentration of income is the structural heterogeneousness of the 
economy and society resulting from intense and partial processes of 
modernization that have helped to create wide internal gaps in terms 
of productivity, decision-making ability and, consequently, personal 
wealth and income. 
5« The relationship between the structures and trends of the 
population and income distribution are highly complex; the inter-play 
between them is not usually direct and it is frequently no easy matter 
to distinguish clearly the whole chain of social links between one 
dimension and the other. These relationships may occur at various 
levels, ranging from the wider macro-structural level of global social 
formations and styles of development to the more specific micro-social 
level of the individual and family. This study can do little more 
than alude briefly to just a few of the many problems and relationships 
involved. In the first place, from a general point of view, a 
historically defined type of social formation implies, albeit in 
varying degree, a particular form of income distribution and, 
moreover, its own particular population structure and growth pattern. 
This is not to deny that some problems may be common to various social 
formations or that each dimension has a relative autonomy; the point is 
that they share certain similarities and influences which can only be 
explained at the rather abstract level of the society as a whole and 
never at the more specific level ot its internal contents. 
6. The way income is distributed, the groups among which it is 
distributed, the economic and social functions of those groups and 
the amount of power they possess to accumulate and retain income are 
all factors which help to define the nature of the prevailing social 
order. The struggle for income is a major element in social and 
/political dynamics, 
political dynamics, and something rather similar occurs with 
population. The absolute and relative size of the population, 
its tendency to expand or diminish, its ecological distribution, 
the extent and manner of its participation in economic production, 
the existence of population surpluses (or "reserve armies1"') and 
their function in the labour market are just a few of the aspects 
v/hich go to determine the configuration of the type of society, 
but they are also, and very largely, a product of the society and 
of the inter-play of forces therein. At this level, it is not 
difficult to distinguish the relationships that exists between 
these population aspects and the distribution of income; for 
example, those that derive from the labour (or consumer) market and 
its function of incorporating the population of working age in the 
labour force, on the one hand, and of allocating income (wages and 
salaries), on the other. In both cases, government policies have 
a capital influence on the concrete form that these connexions 
take on within the context of the prevailing relationships of 
domination. 
7. At the other extreme, and at a less general level, the individuals 
and families appear as basic social units both in their capacity as 
income recipients and nuclei of consumption and in their capacity as 
fundamental demographic agents which take decisions in such matters 
under conditions of variable heteronomy, depending on the social 
class to which they belong and on other types of participation in 
society. This is another important area of convergence between 
population and income in which the trend towards more coherent 
individual and family behavioural patterns and a greater modernization 
of attitudes can be seen as desirable. Judging from some empirical 
evidence, the highest levels of income and most rational patterns 
of consumption are not necessarily mutually exclusive and tend to 
concide with family planning, since the objective of the latter, 
now as always, is to increase income and to utilize it in a manner 
more in keeping with consumer preferences. It can thus be assumed 
that a distribution policy which tends to standardize incomes and 
/living conditions 
living conditions will also nake it possible to standardize reproductive 
patterns, by means of a downward-oriented process of assimilation of 
the pattern followed by the middle and high income groups, which are 
the groups which have lower fertility rates and reach more rational 
decisions in respect of the ideal size of the family. 
8. The problem is obviously complex and the little empirical evidence 
that is available does not support all the conjectures and hypotheses 
that can be devised with regard to the mutual connexions and 
influences of population and income. As a kind of introductory 
summary, however, one can say that there is a certain community of 
roots and causal factors which have a simultaneous bearing on the 
dynamics of both population and income and which deilve both from 
the structure of society and from the conduct of the families and 
individuals« Their correct identification as units of a complex 
scheme of social relationships is one of the biggest problems facing 
social research in this field and the formulation of more appropriate 
strategies and policies than exist at present. 
9» The situation posed by the high growth rates of the urban 
population is extremely problematical» It generates a demand for 
an expansion of employment opportunities which modern urban productive 
sectors are in no position to offer. In this respect, the process of 
urbanization in Latin America differs from similar situations in the 
past in terms of the speed of internal migration. In a very short 
time, the region has witnessed a spatial redistribution of population 
which, under different circumstances, took place elsewhere over a 
much longer period of time. Moreover, the process has gone hand in 
hand with an unprecedented rate of demographic growth. 
10. Furthermore, the phenomenon described above is accompanied by 
rates of overt unemployment in the cities - especially medium-sized 
cities - which are higher than the overall average in most of the 
countries, and by a "false tertiarization" of the economy due to the 
fact that employment is growing faster in the services and trade 
sectors than in the basic productive sectors and causing serious 
/decline in 
decline in productivity and increase in under-employment. This is 
one of the structural causes of the phenomenon of urban marginality 
which is increasingly apparent in the style of development prevailing 
in Latin America» 
11. Nevertheless, despite the low incomes of the unemployed or 
underemployed urban masses, some kind of change and improvement in 
income distribution would seem to come about through the process of 
urbanization. The reason for this is that urban life provides access 
to a number of benefits that are not available to rural sectors. In 
particular, access to education, health and sanitary services» 
! 
recreation and cultural life are advantages that rarely extend to 
the countryside. No less important is the possibility of 
diversifying consumption in a society which places a high value on 
this objective. Confirmation of this assumption can be found in 
studies that were carried out, for example, in Peru where, in 1967j 
the large majority of migrants to Lima considered that their situation 
had improved substantially since they had left their place of origin. 
12. To what extent is the urban economy of these countries going 
to be able to maintain the kind of expansion of physical infrastructure 
and services that is necessary to meet the demands of the growing 
population? The magnitude of the task can be gauged from the estimate 
that the urban population in Latin America will increase by 75 million 
persons during this decade, compared with 18 million during the 1960*s. 
The demand for public and private investment resources for these 
services is very great and, to a certain extent, competes with the 
need to accelerate the expansion of the fixed capital investments 
of the productive sectors of the economy. 
13. In rural areas, the problem is just as acute. In spite of 
internal migration, the rural population continues to grow at a 
considerable speed. The annual average growth rate of the rural 
population of Latin America was 1.5 per cent during the 1960's. 
Nevertheless, in many countries the figure was much higher. The 
problem of employment has become more critical, on the one hand, 
/because of 
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because of the slow expansion of agricultural production and, on the 
other, as a result of the agricultural mechanization that has been 
taking place in the largest and most modern productive units and has 
tended to reduce the permanent labour force accordingly. Moreover, 
where some significant expansion may take place in the export-oriented 
agricultural sectors, the multiplier effects deriving from tax 
collection tend, because of the urban bias of fiscal policy, mainly 
to benefit the cities. If these trends are not arrested, it is 
likely that the migratory pressure will intensify or that the 
demographic pressure among rural sectors living at subsistence level 
will increase,thereby provoking a further decline in their standards 
of living. 
As has been pointed out above, the inter-relationships between 
the process of development, demographic growth and redistribution of 
income are complex, while empirical data on the subject are still 
very meagre. In addition, such generalizations as could be made are 
often invalidated because of the wide variety of situations that 
exist. An analysis of the subject can be attempted, however, although 
on a very tentative basis. 
15. The influence of changes in the age and sex structure of the 
population, which does not show up in analyses of global tendencies, 
is particularly relevant in this respect. It is due to the individual's 
varying capacity as both consumer of goods and services and producer. 
16. To begin with, the productive capacity of the population and 
its ability to generate income is affected both by the relative size 
of the economically active population and by the level of participation 
of the population in the labour force. Available information indicates 
that, in 1970, the proportion of the population of working age 
(between 14 and 64 years old) was similar to that of other developing 
countries but much lower than that of the developed countries. The 
tendency over the past two decades was towards a slight decline. 
From the point of view of the population's participation in the work 
force, however, Latin America is at a notorious disadvantage. In 1970, 
/the active 
the active population represented 31 per cent of the total population 
whereas the figure for the whole of the developing world (including 
Latin America) was ̂ 0 per cent and for the developed countries 
per cent. This proportion also declined during the previous 
period, owing mainly to a reduction in the participation of men 
which more than offset the increase in the participation of women. 
1?. Despite the increase, the participation of women continues to 
be very low compared with that of other regions. According to studies 
conducted in 1970, the figure was 19 per cent of the total female 
population in Latin America, compared with 33 per cent in the 
developing world as a whole and 38 per cent in the developed countries. 
By contrast, the participation of children of 10 to 14 years old in 
the work force was five times higher than that in the industrialized 
countries and that of persons aged more than 65 was twice as high. 
18. From another point of view, the new age structure is reflected 
in the dependency ratio, which measures the ratio between the 
population less than 15 and more than 65 years old and the population 
between 15 and 64 years old. This ratio has been increasing over 
recent decades, albeit at a decreasing rate, which shows that the 
growth of the economically unproductive population is even faster 
than that of the total population and the labour force. 
19. The drop in the global participation of the population in the 
labour force referred to above does not derive solely from a relative 
decline in the population of working age. It is partly the result of 
the slower expansion of employment opportunities generated by the 
productive system and partly that of the systematic raising of 
technical training standards which postpone people's entry into the 
labour force. These stricter standards are not only due to the 
greater technological requirements of economic activities but, also, 
to the fact that social pressures have produced a surplus in the 
supply of better-educated labour by means of the expansion of 
enrollment in secondary schools = at a rate several times greater 
than the growth of the total population. As a result, the problem 
of overt and disguised unemployment referred to above has assumed 
new forms. 
/20. The 
20. The foregoing does not mean that there is a simple inverse 
relationship between the degree of education of the population and 
the level of unemployment. Indeed, some country studies indicate that 
the highest level of relative unemployment in 1970 was among people 
who had received secondary education, while illiterate and uneducated 
groups registered lower levels of unemployment than the national 
average. One should make no hasty generalizations, but the phenomenon 
is definitely significant and suggests the existence of a certain 
degreee of non-functionality of secondary education in terms of the 
demand for employment. 
21. It is necessary to see what type of education is being offered 
and what its effects are on the quality of the labour force. Empirical 
evidence indicates that among the various branches of secondary 
education, which generally speaking have expanded rapidly in Latin 
America, the relative participation of general secondary education 
(which is a pre-university stage) increased considerably, more than 
that of technical secondary education. Since the former, is not 
equally available to all social groups and benefits mainly the middle 
and high income groups, one can ask to what extent it has a 
redistributive effect in favour of the low income groups in terms 
of levels of employment. As to the demographic trend, the modernizing 
effect would seem more positive since the increase in general school 
enrollment is conducive to greater and more efficient family planning. 
22. To sum up, the analysis of some of the demographic trends that 
have accompanied the process of urbanization illustrates the complex 
nature of the phenomenon and of its distributive effects. Owing to 
the lack of sufficient empirical data, these tendencies pose more 
questions than they answer satisfactorily. Moreover, situations 
differ so widely according to the country and region involved that 
any generalizations are dangerous and not necessarily valid. However, 
many of the problems mentioned would seem to be common to a large 
number of countries. In particular, internal migration and the very 
rapid increase in the urban population appear to be of considerable 




because of the demand for a greater number of employment opportunities, 
services and urban equipment tends to re-occur, although with certain 
variations, in very different regions. The incapacity of the systems 
to cope with these pressures is apparent in the tendency to create 
new types of social differentiation, in which a growing segment of 
the society is virtually excluded from participating in the talcing 
of decisions and prevented from enjoying the benefits of economic 
growth while another minority sector becomes modernized and imitates 
the patterns of life and consumption of the industrially advanced 
societies. 
23. No less important are the problems - several of which they share 
with the urban environment - that arise in the rural areas, where most 
of the population of the countries of the Third World still live. 
Demographic expansion continues to be high in relative terms and to 
exceed the capacity to generate employment in the most productive 
and modern rural activities. Given the new problems that it poses 
in the cities, it is no solution to accelerate the already intensive 
process of migration. In both the urban and the rury.1 areas, social 
marginality and relative poverty exist as a result of the concentration 
of income and wealth, which retains many traditional features that 
are difficult to erradicate without a major structural transformation. 
24. The relationship between development and population has been 
studied for a long time in relation to economic and social theories. 
More recently, and especially since the Second World War, a set of 
hypotheses and premises of a neo-Malthusian nature has been devised, 
particularly in the central countries, which points to the negative 
effect of rapid demographic growth on the process of economic and 
social development. The result has been the frequently hasty adoption 
of policy decisions that emphasize the need to act directly and 
exclusively upon the demographic variables in order to reduce the 
birth rate as the most rapid and economic means of intensifying the 
process of economic growth. The realization that the most fertile 
groups are also the poorest has created great expectation regarding 
the stimulating effect that a reduction in the growth rate can have 
on the expansion of saving, investment and growth. 
/25. However, 
25« However, although a reduction in demographic expansion may 
bring some relief to mass poverty, it neither contributes to its 
complete erradication nor can be considered a means of accelerating 
growth, since it does not make up for the lack of the necessary 
economic and social dynamism. A fairly original conception of the 
relationship between population expansion and economic development 
has been developing in Latin 'America which questions the strictly 
demographic approach to the problem, in so far as it assigns foremost 
importance to the institutional, social and political obstacles that 
hinder the development process, outstanding among which are the 
factors that affect the demographic variables. This is not to 
ignore the fact that demographic growth in Latin America is extremely 
high. But it does prevent jumping to the hasty conclusion that what 
is needed is to reduce the demographic growth rate as if it were 
isolated from the wider concept of economic and social development. 
What is important is to establish correctly which are the real 
obstacles that have prevented more rapid development - capable of 
eliminating mass poverty and integrating existing marginal groups -
since, ultimately, it is that which will determine the demographic 
trend. 
26. A development policy should face boldly the structural 
limitations and shortcomings arising from the prevailing economic 
and social system. In doing so, it must not overlook specific 
sectoral policies on whose coherence and effectiveness the degree 
and manner of articulation of the general policies will depend. A 
demographic policy will therefore only be appropriate in so far as 
it is a consistent expression of the general development policy. 
2?. A development style, that is to say the set of values and 
targets that a society pursues, the means and resources it is 
prepared to employ and the changes it will introduce to promote a 
particular pattern of development, represents the type of option 
that each country must choose for itself in accordance with its 
institutions and its own decision-making process. Each country 
/will have 
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will have to define the extent and type of relationship with other 
countries that it is prepared to accept in the field of investment, 
utilization of resources and know-how, styles of life, consumption 
habits, or demographic patterns. It will have to decide to what 
extent the population is to be incorporated in the decision-making 
process at the various levels of society - in enterprises, in the 
formulation and implementation of economic and social policies, in 
Government institutions, in the development of infrastructural 
projects and in urban and rural planning. It must also decide to 
what extent and how quickly the results of the development of the 
productive forces are to be distributed among the various population 
groups and, to what extent a structure of consumption is to be 
developed that will be capable of attending to the basic needs of 
the population and reproducing a style of life in accordance with 
the sets of values to which the society aspires. It is within the 
context of these and other related definitions that the problem of 
a population and redistribution policy, with ample participation by 
the people, must be tackled. 
28. As regards the instruments and mechanisms of social participation, 
it is fundamental always to distinguish which social groups one is 
dealing with and what position they hold in economic production and 
income distribution. Obviously, if the process of participation 
were restricted to wage-earners, vast segments of the population 
would be left out which are not made up of typical wage-earners and 
whose means of subsistence are bound up with other activities. This, 
for example, is the case of own-account urban workers and smallholders 
or sharecroppers. In broad terms, a clear differentiation should here 
be established between various sectors: first, between urban and rural 
sectors; second, between marginal or under-employed sectors and 
wage-earners employed in modern enterprises, in urban areas; and, 
finally, between sectors engaged in subsistence activities and those 
involved in markedly commercial activities, whether export-oriented 
or not, in the rural areas. Among wage-earners employed in modern 
enterprises, the most suitable form of participation would undoubtedly 
/be through 
be through such organizations as trade unions, administrative 
committees, etc.; by contrast, own-account urban workers or rural 
workers living in subsistence economies would seem to be more suited 
to co-operative forms of participation, possibly connected with their 
place of residence. Be this as it may, the foregoing is an 
illustration of a question that can only be answered in the light of 
the concrete experience which is being acquired in various areas and 
which will have to be properly evaluated. 
29« A process such as that described gives a new meaning to the 
definition of the redistribution and population policies, since 
these policies should not be imposed on the population in an 
authoritarian manner but as a result of decisions reached democratically 
and with the widest possible participation, not only as regards certain 
personal aspects but also in respect of the particular style and 
fundamental orientation of development. 
30. In other words, what is needed is a clear understanding of the ,< 
importance of the policy instruments to be utilized and of the content 
and orientation that they are to assume so as to ensure the 
effectiveness of a development strategy which has been determined in 
accordance with democratic procedures and with ample social participation. 
As far as redistribution policies are concerned, for example, it is 
obvious that the income and tax policies of the past do not affect 
the population as a whole and that there are major groups, such as 
the rural sectors or marginal urban groups, which derive very little 
benefit from them. For the benefits of development to reach these 
sectors in any real sense, it is essential for new redistribution 
instruments to be devis-ed. Moreover, since these groups only 
participate to a very small extent in the markets, the instruments 
must be geared far more specifically towards the redistribution of 
effective consumption than towards that of their monetary income. 
This means that investment and production programmes must give high 
priority to the'supply of essential consumer goods. From another 
point of view, it also requires a reform of agricultural land 
/ownership and 
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ownership and a reorganization of the marketing system for products, 
inputs and capital goods, with special attention to the needs of rural 
workers and smallholders. 
31. As regards the need to increase the level of employment 
opportunities in both the urban and rural modern sectors, consideration 
must be given not only to the most suitable type of technology for 
the degree of labour intensiveness required but also to the type of 
goods to be produced, since the use and combination of the productive 
factors (technology and labour) vary greatly according to the type of 
product and the organization and size of the productive unit. It will 
be appreciated, therefore, that the process of redistribution does not 
end with the application of a number of direct measures but affects 
the general orientation of the development process and the effective 
participation of the various majority social groups in that process. 
32. The current trend towards greater participation of women in 
the labour force must be stimulated and facilitated since, from the 
demographic point of view, it has a positive effect on reproductive 
patterns. There is known to be a close relationship between female 
employment in modern occupations and fecundity. Various factors 
contribute to obstruct the entry of women into the labour force, 
from negative social images and values regarding work outside the 
home to the age and number of children to be looked after. It can 
therefore be assumed that greater female participation would 
necessarily have an inverse effect on fertility, and a favourable 
effect on the gross per capita income of the family owing to the 
reduction in the dependency ratio«. Consequently, an effective 
female employment policy may be a major factor in the trend towards 
a decline in the birth rate. It is, however, unlikely for it to be 
so on its own since, to be effective, it would have to be accompanied 
by a series of complementary measures which would facilitate the 
reorganization of family life and the provision of necessary services 
previously supplied by the mother. 
/33- It 
33« It is also well-known that the close inverse relationship 
between the levels of socio-economic stratification, on the one 
hand, and the fecundity rates and average size of a family, on 
the other, poses the problem of social classes as a central issue 
of a population strategy. It has been proved sufficiently conclusively 
that various negative relationships exist between women's fertility 
and their educational level, the occupational category and level of 
their husband, social mobility, expenditure on consumption, and 
other variables that reflect the socio-economic level of the population. 
This suggests that a redistribution policy operating through these 
variables, and particularly through education, may be able to reduce 
fertility in the lowest socio-economic brackets. It would be wrong, 
however, to expect any automatic or immediate results from such 
policies, which are known to be very difficult to formulate and 
implement. On the one hand, the relationships referred to appear 
to be valid in certain social contexts and. not in others - generally 
those with a higher level of economic and social development; 
moreover, in contexts where they are valid, there would seem to be 
critical points, or thresholds, beyond which the factor involved 
seems to start operating. Such matters as these have to be resolved 
on the basis of empirical data before any specific policies can be 
defined for particular situations, so that proper account can be 
taken of the intervening variables and the different population and 
development contexts. Furthermore, account must be taken of the 
"deferred effect" of many of these factors in generating changes 
in demographic attitudes and conduct. 
3^. On the other hand, there are policies which have an obvious 
redistributive effect but which may provoke increases in demographic 
expansion. This is the case of nutrition and health policies designed 
to reduce infant mortality, which affects above all the poorest social 
groups. Despite their effect on population growth, however, the human 
values on which these policies are based are now unquestionable. This 
being so, it would seem essential to complement such measures with 
other alternative policies designed to promote a conscientious and 
/responsible attitude 
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responsible attitude in these families, such as might result from 
access to the necessary medical information to regulate births 
rationally and from a suitable education policy to instill in new 
generations the concept of responsible family organization. 
35. Policies designed to reduce the growth rate of the population 
by means of birth control and family planning must take into account 
the variety of national situations that exist and the right of States 
to adopt different styles of development, as has been stated above. 
On no account could a policy exclusively designed to reduce the birth 
rate, irrespective of the complex set of socio-economic factors 
impeding economic growth and social development, be considered 
acceptable and effective. 
36. One very important aspect is the need to define policies in 
respect of the spatial distribution of population. It must be clearly 
understood, in this respect, that the levels of population for the 
next few years are already determined by the demographic trends of 
the recent past. Similarly, it must be borne in mind that the 
greatest pressure will be felt in the urban areas, although this 
does not mean that there will be any lessening of existing pressure 
in rural areas. Demographic concentration in the large metropolitan 
areas has various effects on the spatial and personal distribution 
of income, since it brings about a concentration of infrastructural 
activities and public services in the cities to the serious detriment 
of investment capability and equitable distribution among the less 
urbanized population. Urban concentration may even reproduce the 
threat to the ecological system from which the industrially advanced 
countries are suffering. Once again, one must remember that this 
consideration cannot serve as the motive force behind a policy of 
geographical distribution of the population but must be understood 
within the context of a new style of development capable of generating 
a satisfactory rate of economic growth which, in terms of the 
composition of its production, is designed to benefit predominantly 




economic progress and transformation. Regional and spatial policy 
is a kind of major crossroads of demographic and income distribution 
policies. 
37» To sum up, the foregoing pages contain a general analysis of 
the relationship between population and income distribution in terms 
both of some of their most important theoretical connexions and of 
several policies that can serve as the basis of an attempt to modify 
the'present complicated state of both dimensions. They set out to 
give a bird's-eye view of the population situation from the point of 
view of its structure and internal dynamics and from that of its 
relationship with other social dimensions, such as employment, 
education, urbanization and income distribution. They also show 
how the individual and family as basic social units have a decisive 
influence on the taking of decisions affecting their personal future 
and the state of society. Consequently, the search for empirical 
answers and the orientation of the specific policies must also 
comprise a wide and comprehensive range of social levels and 
environments, from the global social structure to individual 
motivations and their type of rationalization. 
38. At these various levels, there are a number of points where 
population and income distribution meet; some of these have been 
indicated above. Such points of contact would seem to be clearer 
at the level of the more comprehensive policies. For example, some 
income distribution policies and instruments (education, health, 
nutrition, housing) appear to have different but significant degrees 
of influence on patterns of demographic behaviour (fecundity, mortality, 
size of family, etc.). This study has also shown how the rationality 
of patterns of consumption and urban styles of life derive from a 
wider rationality to be found in the motivations of individuals, and 
from social processes that can contribute to better planning and 
orientation of social behaviour in the field of demography. The 
tendency towards the integration of these various specific modes 
of behaviour and the configuration of complex sets of action that 
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reflect a greater reciprocal coherence and are more representative 
of the convergence of the aspirations of individuals and social 
policies, is an inevitable process but one whose speed will depend 
on the quality of the supporting policies. It is frequently said 
that the present high growth rate of the population is transitional 
and that, like the concentration of income, it is a factor \tfhich 
will resolve itself in time once certain spontaneous corrective 
mechanisms begin to operate. Without entering into a discussion of 
the coherence and effectiveness of these mechanisms, it would seem 
unquestionable that the situation today is so serious and urgent 
that it is impossible to rely on - even less, wait for - these 
compensatory factors to take effect. Without going to the other 
extreme and talking of inminent catastrophy requiring rapid, major 
surgery, it seems undeniable that there is a need for a harmonious 
body of policies based on a general development strategy and designed 
to attack at the roots the problems of undesired or unplanned 
population growth and of concentration of income and dissemination 
of poverty. 
39« The requirements of such specific policies are various and have 
already been suggested, although only in outline. Attention need 
only be drawn to a few points. First, there is an internal need for 
the policies to be coherent and reciprocally complementary and an 
external need f or ad justment to realistic and feasible social 
objectives, defined and selected in accordance with a general 
strategy implying a style of development and model of society that 
is genuinely desired and democratically selected. Secondly, there 
is a need for theoretical and empirical data on which to base the 
policies, deriving from the discovery of basic causal relationships 
and of the reactions of the individuals and groups to the different 
types of social situation which the policies may help to create. 
It is unfortunate fact, that what is known about these problems 
today, although empirically well-founded, is very little and frequently 
inadequate if not erroneous- A serious research effort in this . 
direction must be carried out with the utmost urgency. 
/25. However, 
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Finally, there must be a social consensus both as to the 
objectives of the policies and as to the means to be employed to 
attain them. There is no question how important a broad social 
consensus is, not only at the policy definition stage but also at 
the implementation stage. Without the collaboration of the people, 
any social policy, particularly in the field of demography, runs 
the serious risk of failing, or of bringing about other results 
than those desired and perhaps being counter-productive in respect 
of the objectives pursued. It is not merely a question of 
mobilizing machinery for collective persuasion but of educating 
people and promoting objectives that are genuinely and consciously 
desired by society in general and by the groups concerned in 
particular. It is a question, neither more or less, of converting 
the dominant Utopias into social and individual objectives and into 
courses of action that will be conducive to collective well-being 
and greater social equity. 

